Green trees for greenhouse gases: a fair trade-off? by Schmidt, C W
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eep in northeast Bolivia along the border with
Brazil lies a 4-million-acre tract of rain forest
called the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park.
Home to over 700 species of birds and exotic
animals such as the jaguar, howler monkey, and
giant anteater, the park was once a prime candi-
date for the kind of slash-and-burn agriculture decimating tropical
forests around the world. But in a remarkable twist of fate, the park
is now protected for the next 30 years under an agreement signed
by the Bolivian government, The Nature Conservancy, and a
Columbus, Ohio–based utility company called American Electric
Power (AEP).
What does a rain forest in Bolivia have that an American utility
company wants to preserve? The answer is elemental: carbon.
While forests retain carbon in plants, detritus, and soils, power
plants—including AEP’s—spew it into the air as carbon dioxide
(CO2), the main greenhouse gas behind global warming. Industrial
CO2 emissions aren’t currently regulated by federal law, but a num-
ber of companies are trying to do something about the problem
voluntarily. AEP’s carbon sequestration program in Bolivia was
launched through its involvement with the Climate Challenge
Program, a voluntary greenhouse gas reduction effort between the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the electric utility industry.
According to AEP’s calculations, the $9.5 million they would spend
to pay for park rangers and other expenses associated with main-
taining the forest and thereby protecting the carbon contained
within its biota was far less than would have been spent installing
equipment to block CO2 emissions from its own plants. “And if we
wind up saving some tropical species and indigenous cultures along
the way, then so much the better,” says Dale Heydlauff, AEP’s vice
president of environmental affairs. 
Carbon Sinks Take Root
Many scientists see sequestering carbon in biotic “sinks” such as
forests and farmlands in the terrestrial biosphere as a win–win
proposition for the environment—“a way to improve the atmos-
phere while doing things you ought to be doing anyway, like pro-
tecting natural resources and promoting sustainable development,”
says Gregg Marland, a research scientist and expert in carbon
sequestration at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. 
Because atmospheric CO2 is distributed worldwide, it should-
n’t matter if the gas is blocked from being released from the end
of a pipe or sequestered in the biosphere as long as there is a net
global reduction of it in the atmosphere. Scientists have long sug-
gested that trees—newly planted or never cut down in the first
place—could soak up excess CO2, but the concept didn’t take
root with policy makers until 1988, when a report titled The
Prospect of Solving the CO2 Problem through Global Reforestation
was drafted by Marland while he was working with the DOE’s
Office of Energy Research. This pivotal document suggested that
carbon sinks, like emissions reductions, could be credited under
an international framework to reduce greenhouse gases. The con-
troversial idea was discussed during the 1992 Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and formed the basis of a carbon crediting
system incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas
emissions during the last hours of negotiations in Kyoto, Japan, in
1997 [see sidebar, p. A126].
Carbon sequestration under the Kyoto Protocol falls under land
use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities. The clear-
est stakeholder consensus concerning how to define these activities
is found in Article 3.3 of the protocol, which states that domestic
afforestation (planting trees where none existed previously) and
reforestation can be counted toward compliance with a country’s
emissions reduction target, while emissions from deforestation
would count against that target. In addition, the language of the
protocol stipulates that LULUCF activities can only be credited if
they are “human-induced.” According to Marland, this qualifier is
intended to ensure that countries aren’t credited for growth in ter-
restrial sinks resulting from rising levels of atmospheric CO2, which
ironically acts as a kind of plant fertilizer. 
The problem is that negotiators can’t decide what “human-
induced” actually includes. A clear example might include planting
trees on farmland. But other examples, such as the case of a scrub
forest left to grow naturally on abandoned property, are not as obvi-
ous and are still heavily debated. In addition to the practices
described under Article 3.3, a number of countries including the
United States and Canada would like to see credit opportunities
expanded to include a much wider range of activities. These addi-
tional land use activities are still being negotiated and considered
under Article 3.4. 
An example of the kind of land use activity that might be
counted under Article 3.4 is “no-till” farming, which limits carbon
releases because soils aren’t stirred up during planting. Support for
carbon sinks is avid among corn and soybean growers, who already
use no-till farming because it is good for their crops and who stand
to get paid carbon credits (possibly by the federal government)
under Article 3.4 as an incidental bonus. 
One of the most difficult and unresolved questions concerns
how credits for carbon sinks will be traded among parties to the
protocol. Marland suggests the system will involve payments made
by polluters to private or public organizations responsible for pro-
tecting carbon sinks such as forests or farmlands. The payments
themselves would have to be sanctioned by the governments
involved, as it is the governments and not the individual industries
that are held to the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Breakdown at The Hague
As any climate change negotiator will tell you, applying carbon
sinks toward an emissions reduction agreement is exquisitely com-
plicated. “Each piece of a sinks program is as difficult as any previ-
ous international environmental agreement we’ve ever worked on,”
says Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center on Global
Climate Changen in Arlington, Virginia, a nonprofit organization
dedicated to educating the public and policy makers on climate
change. “Putting the pieces together in a single agreement raises the
complexity by a few orders of magnitude,” she says. “These issues
go to the heart of a nation’s economy and the way it manages its
natural resources.” 
Illustrating this complexity, the most recent meeting of Kyoto
delegates, held at The Hague, The Netherlands, in November 2000,
collapsed over the issue of carbon sinks, delivering what many see as a
deathblow to the already beleaguered agreement. At the meeting, the
United States pushed hard for rights to apply its vast forests toward
its emissions reduction target, something European Union (EU)
countries, which aren’t heavily forested, perceived as a ploy to obtain
carbon credits without having to do anything. Dan Lashof, a staff sci-
entist with the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington,
D.C., says the United States created the impression among some
negotiators in the EU and elsewhere that it was trying to benefit from
activities that might otherwise be regarded as “business as usual” andincidental to the Kyoto Protocol itself, such
as preserving forestland. 
Claussen agrees this was indeed the
case, but offers that the U.S. negotiators—
hamstrung by congressional skeptics who
think complying with the Kyoto Protocol
would be prohibitively expensive—had lit-
tle choice but to seek ways to comply with
the treaty at the lowest possible cost. “It all
came down to this view among negotiators
that the only way to sell this thing to the
Congress is to show them that we can do it
for free, which is a joke,” says Claussen.
“We need to acknowledge there are going
to be costs associated with this.” 
Meanwhile, some developing countries
expressed their own reservations. Their fear
is that a system that makes them the
guardians of carbon stocks (or masses of
carbon contained in any biotic reservoir)
paid for by polluters in developed countries
could not only deny them sovereignty over
their own lands but also limit opportunities
for technology transfer from the developed
world in an arrangement that emphasizes
natural resource preservation over sustain-
able industrial development. 
According to Marland, sharp disagree-
ments over sinks activities beyond forestry
also crippled the talks. “Article 3.4 is where
things continued to fall apart in The
Hague,” he says. “The U.S. delegates were
insisting that they get something out of
Article 3.4, but the Europeans (who lack
the large agricultural lands that would be
relevant under Article 3.4) are trying to
limit this as much as possible.” 
Bring On the Accountants
The critical question regarding sinks hinges
on whether a ton of carbon sequestered in
the biosphere equals a ton of carbon saved
from release by reduced fossil fuel combus-
tion. Establishing an accounting scheme that
treats these two units equally is a significant
challenge. At issue are a host of ecological
and statistical ques-
tions, differing local
land use practices,
cultural factors, veri-
fiability, and even
basic definitions.
For instance, a sur-
vey conducted by
Gyde H. Lund, a
forestry consultant
based in Manassas,
Virginia, identified
over 300 unique
definitions of “for-
est,” many with
their own values for
parameters such as
tree height and
density.
Several major
issues complicate the
accounting process.
For example, how
can one be sure that
any given sink is
actually perma-
nent? Unlike emis-
sions reductions in
the industrial sec-
tor, which arguably
might be consid-
ered permanent,
carbon in the bios-
phere could be
released at some
point in the future,
for example through
fires or deliberate
human activity. This
raises all sorts of
questions. “Say a
farmer gets flooded out, or his crops develop
a disease, and he needs to plow the crop and
apply a clean seedbed for a few years,” says
Jon Dogget, senior director of governmental
relations at the American Farm Bureau, a
trade organization based in Washington,
D.C. “Does that farmer then become respon-
sible for removing the carbon? How are you
going to deal with that?”
A further problem is “leakage,” which
refers to the possibility that blocking carbon
releases by LULUCF activities in one loca-
tion might simply accelerate their release
somewhere else. Even Heydlauff admits
leakage could undermine the success of its
program in Bolivia. “Leakage is the Achilles’
heel to all these projects,” he says. “We have
a good leakage prevention program in
Bolivia, but I can’t prove that timber pro-
duction isn’t shifting to Peru, Paraguay, or
Brazil. The only way to prevent that from
happening is to have a global program with
careful emissions inventories adjusted to
represent changes in carbon stock.” 
According to Marland, global carbon
releases from burning fossil fuels can be esti-
mated to an accuracy of perhaps ± 10%.
This is because fossil fuels, being a traded
commodity, are carefully tracked by indus-
try. Sandra Brown, a senior program officer
for Winrock International, a nonprofit inter-
national development organization head-
quartered in Morrilton, Arizona, says that
comparable accuracy for carbon stock mea-
surements can also be achieved as long as the
financial and human resources are available
to carry out the measurements and statisti-
cally robust study plans are employed. “It all
comes down to how much money you
have,” she says. “You can estimate changes in
carbon stock directly by quantifying forest
parameters and then going back and doing
your statistical analyses on the changes at a
later point in time. Forest ecologists have
been using these techniques for decades.” 
Nevertheless, a majority of scientists
believe that there still could be considerable
uncertainty in carbon measurements. In
fact, a host of extraneous variables need to
be considered in order to estimate carbon
fluctuations on a global scale. For instance,
timber products retain carbon; it is not all
released as emissions when forests are cut
down. And the energy required to produce
timber substitutes such as concrete and steel
may actually result in more carbon releases
to the environment than would be saved by
preserving a forest.
Some also question whether it is possi-
ble to estimate changes in global carbon
stock when the baseline numbers are so
high. For instance, in contrast to the 6.3
billion tons of carbon released yearly from
burning fossil fuels, plants retain about 600
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The Kyoto Protocol is the first internationally
binding treaty geared toward reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. Signed by 150
nations in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997,
the protocol seeks to reduce worldwide
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluoro-
carbons, and sulfur hexafluoride to 5%
below 1990 levels by the 2008–2012 time
frame. Country-specific targets contributing
to this goal vary from -8% to 10% (some
underdeveloped countries are actually
allowed to increase their emissions). The tar-
get for the United States is 7%. 
Signing the protocol merely signifies
intent to comply. A country is held to its
mandated target once it deposits an instru-
ment of ratification, something only 32 coun-
tries have done so far. 
The protocol’s origins date back to United
Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (the so-called Earth Summit),
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. This
meeting produced the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which sought to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere to levels
that would minimize climatic interference.
Much of the language currently found in the
Kyoto Protocol derives from this original
document.billion tons of carbon and soils retain
another 1,600 billion tons. Measuring the
aggregate impact of thousands of small-
scale projects against this enormous base-
line is likely to be characterized by a high
degree of statistical uncertainty. 
An example of the kind of solution that
might be applied to this uncertainty is one
suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, the scientific panel
that prepared a special report on land use
and land use change for the negotiators.
The panel proposed that credits or debits
for land use changes might be applied with-
in the context of the uncertainty in their
measurements. To illustrate, say a change in
carbon stock resulting from a particular
land use initiative could be measured to
within ± 40% at a 90% confidence level.
Under such a scenario, credits and debits
might be applied not to the mean of the
estimated amounts of carbon sequestered
but to the mean less 40%, or the value for
which the statistical confidence is highest.
Even if the accounting issues can be
resolved, stakeholders also wonder whether
there is sufficient infrastructure to monitor
changes in carbon stock and verify compli-
ance. To estimate carbon levels with accept-
able accuracy requires frequent, extensive,
and potentially costly periods of sampling.
For example, AEP’s researchers in Bolivia
not only use ground sampling to measure
changes in biomass, they also plan to
employ Winrock International to fly over
the park on a frequent basis and generate
aerial videography that will be fed into a
computer to calculate carbon estimates.
However, AEP is in a fairly unique posi-
tion—it has a lot of money. In contrast, the
majority of forestry and agricultural busi-
nesses around the world are small-scale
operations, even in the United States, where
more than 95% of all farms are family-
owned. Training and coordinating individ-
uals to monitor carbon levels on private
lands could be difficult to do. 
Brown, while acknowledging the chal-
lenges involved, suggests that the growth of
carbon sequestration initiatives will be
matched by consortiums of small-scale
farmers and businesses who will take on the
responsibility of measuring carbon, espe-
cially considering that carbon credits will
become paid commodities. “You can envi-
sion a half a dozen farmers getting together
and spreading sampling points across all
their fields,” she says. “There will be people
out there who know how do this and are
willing to sell their services.” 
On the Brighter Side . . .
Despite the seemingly overwhelming chal-
lenges, many stakeholders believe carbon
sinks will comprise an important element
in the fight against global warming.
Creative solutions are emerging from a
number of sectors, and it’s likely, Claussen
says, that with continued time, study, and
dialogue a workable mechanism can be
established. 
For example, the Colombian delegation
to The Hague suggested that credits for car-
bon sequestration might be rented to devel-
oped countries rather than sold to them.
This approach, described by one negotiator
as “an elegant solution,” could reduce devel-
oping country concerns over sovereignty,
improve carbon stock accounting, and buy
developed countries some time to develop
innovative industrial technologies to reduce
emissions. 
But no clear mechanism for how such
a rental system might work has been estab-
lished. It’s likely that the transaction
would be between the entity that main-
tains the sink and the entity that is renting
it. Marland says that, as the credits are
rented, they would obviously expire at
some point. This introduces problems
associated with the permanence of the sink
that have yet to be worked out.
Mitch Dubensky, director of forests
and environment at the Washington,
D.C.–based American Forest and Paper
Association, says, “Carbon sequestration
is an opportunity for developing countries
to promote sustainable development and
sustainable forestry. Leakage and perma-
nence will have to be managed through
project design—that is, working with
local communities to manage protected
forests in ways that retain carbon while
providing indigenous people with a liveli-
hood.” Sustainable industries such as
tourism and harvesting of nut crops
would allow the people that live around
the forest to profit off the forest while
protecting the carbon sink it provides.
Domestic Initiatives
While the debate over carbon sinks in the
context of the Kyoto Protocol continues
to rage, a number of domestic initiatives
are quietly beginning to emerge. For
example, in addition to the DOE’s
Climate Challenge Program, two states
have recently enacted legislation mandat-
ing that newly sited power plants cut their
CO2 emissions—in Oregon emissions
must drop by 17% and in Massachusetts
by up to 3%. Both states have allowed
companies to explore the option of offset-
ting their releases by planting trees. Sonia
Hammel, director of air policy and plan-
ning at the Massachusetts Energy Facilities
Siting Board, says board members are
wary of the tree-planting option and have
ceased accepting applications for new tree
programs but have grandfathered in exist-
ing programs and are reviewing the data
carefully. 
In addition, two bills proposed by
Senator Sam Brownback (R–Kansas) also
contain carbon sinks initiatives. One is a
domestic carbon bill (S2540) under
which farmers could receive “conservation
payments” from the federal government if
they enhance carbon storage by alterna-
tive agricultural methods, for example no-
till farming. The other (S2982) is a bill
that provides U.S. companies with tax
credits for enhancing carbon storage
abroad. 
According to a staffer with Senator
Brownback, neither of these bills contains a
trading mechanism that would allow pol-
luters to offset their emissions with land use
practices. This option, which forms the
basis of LULUCF activities under the
Kyoto Protocol, is currently seen as too
controversial for a federal domestic pro-
gram. “We’re just looking for ways to
encourage carbon sinks, not ways to allow
polluters to gain emissions credits by plant-
ing trees,” says the staffer, who acknowl-
edges that “we’re likely to see that option
develop down the road.”
In the meantime, Kyoto negotiators
are gearing up for another round of dis-
cussions in Bonn, Germany, in May of
2001, and it’s likely that the continuing
debate over carbon sinks will dominate
the agenda. The goal is to reach some res-
olution on the issue before the next min-
isterial meeting of Kyoto delegates in
Marrakech, Morocco, next November.
“No one denies the technical challenges
here,” says one negotiator, who wished
not to be identified. “It’s not like we’re
trying to pull a fast one on the environ-
mentalists. We believe that the system can
only work with good accounting. If you
can prove carbon sequestration, then fine,
you get a credit. If you can’t, you don’t
get anything.” 
Lashof adds that many environmental-
ists will accept sinks as a viable aspect of an
emissions reduction framework, but says
that the approach must be predicated on a
few basic principles. “First, a role for sinks
needs to be limited,” he says. “Second, peo-
ple shouldn’t be able to get credit for what
they’re already doing—the goal should be
to reduce greenhouse gases beyond levels
that would exist without the protocol. And
third, the issue of permanence needs to be
addressed. We need an accounting system
that ensures carbon sequestration isn’t just
a temporary measure.” 
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